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FREE SPEECH AND THE CASE FOR
CONSTITUTIONAL EXCEPTIONALISM
Roger P. Alford*
THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE: A COMPARATIVE
LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH. By Ronald J. Krotoszynski,
Jr New York: New York University Press. 2006. Pp. xvi, 301. $50.
INTRODUCTION
Embodied in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is the evocative
proposition that "[e]veryone has the right to freedom of opinion and expres-
sion."' Beneath that abstraction there is anything but universal agreement.
Modern democratic societies disagree on the text, content, theory, and prac-
tice of this liberty. They disagree on whether it is a privileged right or a
subordinate value. They disagree on what constitutes speech and what
speech is worthy of protection. They disagree on theoretical foundations,
uncertain if the right is grounded in libertarian impulses, the promotion of a
marketplace of ideas, or the advancement of participatory democracy. They
disagree on whether the right should be safeguarded by judicial review or
subject to majoritarian legislative values. They disagree on whether the right
may be invoked against infringements resulting from private as well as state
action. In short, the freedom of expression is a universal value that is fraught
with cultural contingencies. It is universal in abstraction and particularized
in application.
There are various responses to this ideological pluralism. The two
most common are constitutional exceptionalism and constitutional com-
parativism. Constitutional exceptionalists argue that the variety of unique
contextual factors informing each state's domestic constitutional law sty-
mies reliance on foreign law in domestic courts; constitutional
comparativists argue that these divergent experiences are relevant. But to
say that comparative experiences are relevant is to say virtually nothing
beyond the bland proposition that they should not be ignored. A more nu-
anced response would articulate just how the comparative experiences are
relevant and forthrightly address the broader goal of the comparative pro-
ject.
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At a minimum, the goal of constitutional comparativists is to promote
"transjudicial dialogue" between nations.2 The stronger form of transjudicial
dialogue argues that constitutional courts should "borrow" from one another
in their decisions, despite the fact that even the most prominent jurists are
woefully uninformed about the most basic differences among and between
the various constitutional and international courts.3 The weaker variant of
this dialogue advances the simple proposition that judges should be aware of
the jurisprudence of peer constitutional courts and international tribunals.4
Ronald Krotoszynski5 counts himself among the proponents of "weak"
transjudicial dialogue:
Foreign judicial decisions could legitimately serve as a kind of judicial
muse-a highly effective foil for contrasting domestic legal understand-
ings; a mirror that reflects not the self, but the other; a kind of grist for
reconsidering long-held assumptions about the way things must be (be-
cause, in a given country, they have always been thus).
6
His recent book, The First Amendment in Cross-Cultural Perspective, is an
effort to promote that transjudicial dialogue.
Krotoszynski's book offers a useful guide to free speech law in the United
States, Canada, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom. As an initial mat-
ter, I question Krotoszynski's conclusions on the value of comparative
analysis, and I doubt the feasibility of a comprehensive analysis of compara-
tive free speech law. Nonetheless, in showcasing the divergence in free speech
law across five modem democracies, Krotoszynski's book is an important
contribution in support of constitutional exceptionalism. Krotoszynski's expo-
sition shows the pluralistic and highly contextual nature of free speech
protections. The data-and its limits-are inconclusive as to whether the
United States is a free speech outlier and demonstrate that we must respect
each country's distinct balancing of countervailing rights and interests in the
free speech arena.
I. THE VALUE OF COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS
In his book, Krotoszynski argues that, "when an almost identical legal
problem arises, the response to that problem in a different cultural milieu
can provide a useful perspective for domestic consideration" (p. 3). What is
2. See Roger P. Alford, In Search of a Theory for Constitutional Comparativism, 52 UCLA
L. REV. 639, 706 (2005); Leila Nadya Sadat, An American Vision for Global Justice: Taking the Rule
of (International) Law Seriously, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REv. 329, 341 (2005); Anne-Marie
Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 191, 213 (2003).
3. Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., "I'd Like to Teach the World to Sing (In Perfect Harmony)":
International Judicial Dialogue and the Muses-Reflections on the Perils and the Promise of Inter-
national Judicial Dialogue, 104 MICH. L. REv. 1321, 1329-30, 1335-36 (2006) (book review).
4. Id. at 1329-30.
5. John S. Stone Chair of Law, The University of Alabama School of Law.
6. See Krotoszynski, supra note 3, at 1325-26.
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refreshing about Krotoszynski's approach is that he embraces comparativ-
ism as offering "useful insights" but fully recognizes the "dangers
associated with simplistic comparative-law borrowing exercises that [are]
utterly insensitive to cultural context" (pp. 3-4). Krotoszynski begins by
defending the utility of comparative free speech analysis. He argues that
there are "at least three reasons for supposing that a comparative law study
of freedom of expression might prove helpful, if not essential, to domestic
students of the subject" (pp. 5-6). While each of these points suggests quite
interesting justifications, I am not sure that any of them answer the question
why comparative analysis of free speech law is helpful, much less essential.
First, Krotoszynski argues that a comparative study of free speech law
"provides a useful perspective with which to check one's baseline assump-
tions about the concept" (p. 6). I agree that comparative experiences shed
light on the salient differences between modem democracies and provide a
prism for exploring the counterfactual. If, for example, one doubts whether a
theory of free speech premised on a Holmesian marketplace of ideas is de-
fensible or desirable, one can reference competing experiences in different
countries to highlight the merits and demerits of that approach. Or if one
wonders whether subordinating free speech to other values such as equality
or human dignity has serious merit, one can find specific instances in which
the consequences of that approach are manifest. But that is primarily useful
as an interesting academic exercise. For most mature democracies, constitu-
tional jurists are bound by text, structure, history, precedent, and national
experience. Each country's free speech "assumptions" are embodied in
those interpretive sources. So a jurist's ability to check his or her own basic
assumptions by relying on comparative experiences is quite properly subject
to those foundational constraints. And as we will see in Part II, these con-
straints confound useful comparisons between countries.
Second, Krotoszynski argues that "judges routinely borrow across inter-
national lines, therefore making some knowledge of foreign legal systems
helpful in understanding or predicting the behavior of domestic judges" (p.
6). However, at least in the United States, there is little support for the
proposition that, in the free speech context, judges routinely borrow across
international lines. They simply don't. One must deeply troll the waters of
First Amendment jurisprudence to come up with those rare instances in
which the Supreme Court references comparative experiences.7 I would
surmise that most practitioners before the Supreme Court have little, if any,
awareness of comparative experiences and almost never reference foreign
jurisprudence in their written briefs or oral arguments! In their professional
judgment, comparative analysis does not feature in the discussion.
7. A careful survey of free speech jurisprudence reveals precious few cases that rely on
comparative or international experiences. See, e.g., Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 200-06
(1992); Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 322-26 (1988).
8. For example, a search of the Supreme Court Briefs database on Westlaw returns over
2100 Supreme Court briefs that have been filed since Roper v. Simmons was decided in March 2005.
Since that time, just over a dozen Supreme Court briefs have relied on Roper v. Simmons (or
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Finally, Krotoszynski argues that "to incorporate basic human rights as
part of the framework of public international law will require increased at-
tention to and effort in comparative legal scholarship" (p. 6). This point is
relevant not for domestic constitutional law but rather for the promotion of
public international law. His suggestion is that knowledge of comparative
experiences will illuminate the growth and development of human rights
law, with domestic jurisprudence percolating up through international law
and practice to inform its content. This argument is similar to Melissa
Waters' proposition of "norm convergence." 9 She argues that the develop-
ment of international norms starts with the exporting of domestic norms as
constitutional courts articulate a particular domestic norm at the transna-
tional level. The norm is subsequently diffused around the world and
becomes part of the international legal discourse. She reasons that "[i]f the
norm becomes sufficiently embedded in a large number of other domestic or
international legal regimes, it becomes the dominant normative standard on
a given issue."' In reading Krotoszynski's analysis of comparative law in
five modem democracies, there is little evidence of norm convergence in the
free speech context. To be sure, there are hate speech provisions in certain
international treaties," and there are international prohibitions on incitement
to genocide." But even those norms are subject to vastly different interpreta-
tions by many states. 3 And beyond the narrow subset of hate speech, there
are widely divergent practices between states and little evidence of a con-
Lawrence v. Texas) to argue that the Constitution should be interpreted in light of foreign or interna-
tional law. In other words, less than one percent of the Supreme Court briefs filed since March 2005
expressly rely on the leading cases that support recourse to comparative experiences.
9. Melissa A. Waters, Mediating Norms and Identity: The Role of Transnational Judicial
Dialogue in Creating and Enforcing International Law, 93 GEO. L.J. 487, 503 (2005).
10. Id.
11. E.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 20(2), adopted Dec. 16,
1966, S. TREATY Doc. No. 95-20, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 ("Any advocacy of national, racial or religious
hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by
law."); International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination art. 4,
adopted Dec. 21, 1965, S. TREATY Doc. No. 95-18, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 ("States Parties condemn all
propaganda and all organizations which are based on ideas or theories of superiority of one race or
group of persons of one colour or ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify or promote racial hatred
and discrimination in any form ... "). See generally, Stephanie Farrior, Molding the Matrix: The
Historical and Theoretical Foundations of International Law Concerning Hate Speech, 14 BERKE-
LEY J. INT'L L. 1 (1996).
12. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. Ill(c),
adopted Dec. 9, 1948, S. TREATY Doe. No. 81-1, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.
13. See John C. Knechtle, When to Regulate Hate Speech, 110 PENN ST. L. REv. 539 (2006)
(discussing hate-speech laws throughout the world, including countries that focus on protection
from violence, others that focus on human dignity, and still others that do not substantially regulate
hate speech); Diane F. Orentlicher, Criminalizing Hate Speech in the Crucible of Trial: Prosecutor v.
Nahimana, 12 NEW ENG. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 17, 47-49 (2005) (discussing divergent practices in
Africa regarding hate speech); Michel Rosenfeld, Hate Speech in Constitutional Jurisprudence: A
Comparative Analysis, 24 CARDOZO L. REV. 1523 (2003) (comparing and contrasting hate-speech
regulation in the United States, Canada, Germany, and the United Kingdom).
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vergence of international norms. 4 Krotoszynski's argument of norm conver-
gence is not supported by the very experiences he outlines in his book.
II. FREE SPEECH IN MODERN DEMOCRACIES
While I am not persuaded by Krotoszynski's articulated rationales, his
comparative analysis has value in the international pluralism it demon-
strates. In order to appreciate this, it is worth briefly summarizing the
foreign free speech regimes outlined in the book. Following Krotoszynski's
lead, I will focus on the key differences within these four jurisdictions as
compared to the United States. I will assume the reader's basic familiarity
with the free speech jurisprudence of the United States.
A. Canada
One of the primary differences between Canada and the United States is
that judicial review of constitutional violations is subject to parliamentary
override. Although rarely used, the Canadian Charter authorizes the federal
and provincial legislatures to override judicial invalidation of a statute
on Charter grounds.'5 As such, the countermajoritarian role of the courts is
notably diminished as compared to the United States. The existence of the
Section 33 power has led to judicial self-restraint: "[T]he Supreme Court
itself sometimes avoids taking steps that would likely provoke a legislative
response" (p. 41).
Second, free speech rights are subject to far less protection because gov-
ernment infringements are subject to only rational basis review. Section 2 of
the Canadian Charter protects nearly every possible type of expressive con-
duct. 6 But the Charter balances this broad definition of speech with a
deferential standard of review. Section 1 of the Charter provides that the
freedoms guaranteed in the Charter are subject to "such reasonable limits
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic
14. See Ambika Kumar, Developments, Using Courts to Enforce the Free Speech Provisions
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 7 CHIi. J. INT'L L. 351, 352-56 (2006)
(discussing divergent state practices in light of the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights' provisions on freedom of expression). The Committee to Protect Journalists has extensive
information regarding state practice that curtails the freedom of expression. The executive director
of the Committee to Protect Journalists has said that while freedom of speech and the practice of
journalism are protected by international law, "these protections increasingly exist in name only."
Joel Simon, Introduction, in ATTACKS ON THE PRESS IN 2006, at 14 (Comm. to Protect Journalists
ed., 2007).
15. P. 28. Section 33(1) of the Canadian Charter provides that "Parliament or the legislature
of a province may expressly declare in an Act of Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be,
that the Act or a provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in section 2 or
sections 7 to 15 of this Charter." Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the
Canada Act 1982, ch. I I (U.K.) [hereinafter Canadian Charter].
16. Its provisions protect "freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, including
freedom of the press and other media of communication." Canadian Charter, supra note 15, § 2.
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society."' 7 In light of this standard, Krotoszynski notes that the Canadian
Supreme Court "almost never invalidate[s] legislation regulating free speech
on Section 2 grounds" (p. 43).
A third provision of the Charter imposes still further limits on the scope
of free speech. Section 27 of the Charter requires constitutional provisions
to be interpreted "in a manner consistent with the preservation and en-
hancement of the multicultural heritage of Canadians."'" The Canadian
Charter thus subordinates free speech protections to the constitutional guar-
antee of equality. As Krotoszynski puts it, "[t]he Canadian Supreme Court
almost never fails to sustain a equality-enhancing law, even if it has the ef-
fect of silencing individual speech activity" (p. 51). Consequently, Canada is
far more likely than the United States to regulate hate speech in light of this
special role that equality and multiculturalism have in its constitutional
structure (p. 55).
Krotoszynski is highly critical of the Canadian approach to speech guar-
antees, particularly as it relates to hate speech (pp. 82-89). But as he
suggests, the differences between Canada and the United States really re-
flect a different accommodation of interests: Canada's approach is far more
communitarian and majoritarian. And despite the criticisms, he concludes
that perhaps the Canadian model "represent[s] a better balancing of the
competing interests-equality and free speech-than the U.S. approach of
privileging free speech over most equality concerns" (p. 92).
B. Germany
Germany and the United States also have dramatically different ap-
proaches to free speech. Most significantly, free speech protections in
Germany are subordinated to the constitutional guarantee of human dignity:
What we find [in Germany] is an inversion of values. The United States
Supreme Court routinely subordinates values associated with personal dig-
nity, honor, and reputation in favor of vindicating free speech claims....
[But] the German constitutional scheme elevates dignity as the "preferred
freedom" and does so quite overtly at the expense of the freedom of
speech. (p. 115)
Second, Germany eschews the theories thought to animate free speech
guarantees in the United States, including the marketplace metaphor and the
democratic self-governance theory'9 :
17. Id. § 1.
18. Id. § 27.
19. The marketplace metaphor embraces a libertarian ethic that citizens should be free to
speak and listen as they think best. Trust is served by a free and full competition for ideas.
Alexander Meiklejohn's competing theory posits that free speech protections exist principally to
facilitate democratic self-governance. This theory recognizes that minority viewpoints should be
protected to ensure that citizens hear and consider all relevant viewpoints. Without free speech,
democracies cannot generate the kind of open discussion necessary for informed self-governance.
Pp. 14-18.
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[The German Constitutional Court has] squarely rejected the marketplace
metaphor, not merely endorsing but effectively requiring the government
to police speech that transgresses the dignity guarantee and to proscribe
and punish speech, speakers, and organizations that advocate the over-
throw of the democratic social order.... [A]II ideas are subject to
government control not only for their content and viewpoint but, by virtue
of the dignity clause, for the manner in which a speaker chooses to express
an idea or viewpoint. (p. 130)
This is not surprising given the history of German politics and the cultural
norm of protecting personal dignity and honor. Regarding self-governance,
the limitations on free speech in Germany only incidentally advance equal-
ity: "Their principal purpose and effect is to advance an overarching civility
project . . ." (p. 137).
A third major difference between the United States and Germany is that,
rather than simply protecting against state infringement of individual rights,
the German Federal Constitutional Court imposes a burden on the state to
take action to secure individual liberties against private harms (p. 102). This
may have the surprising effect of curtailing rather than promoting speech
because the state has an obligation to protect other constitutional rights, in-
cluding the preferred right of human dignity. Thus if a private party makes
truthful assertions about a politician that damage his reputation, the politi-
cian may make a constitutional claim for violations of his human dignity
(pp. 112-14).
Krotoszynski describes the German approach as "seriously flawed in
several key respects" (p. 130), but one should not "dismiss Germany's ap-
proach to freedom of expression as self-evidently misguided or
insufficiently sensitive to the value of free speech in a democratic society"
(p. 94). Germany, in contrast to the United States, places a constitutional
premium on civility and personal dignity as an overarching norm, subordi-
nating expressive values that take precedence in the United States (p. 137).
C. Japan
Again, the Japanese approach to freedom of expression differs markedly
from the American. But it also differs markedly from the Canadian and
German. First, Japan embraces Alexander Meiklejohn's theory of participa-
tory democratic self-governance. Canvassing political, commercial, sexual,
and defamatory speech in Japan, Krotoszynski argues that the Supreme
Court of Japan has articulated a clear and coherent vision of freedom of ex-
pression that embodies Meiklejohn's approach. He notes that "[t]he
Supreme Court of Japan consistently relates free expression to matters of
self-governance, not individual freedom or autonomy" (p. 179).
Another key difference is that the Japanese approach to judicial review
is a minimalist one, granting the political branches tremendous discretion in
regulating speech: "In a fashion consistent with [James] Thayer's maxim,
the Supreme Court of Japan simply declines to interpose its will over the
will of the Diet absent an extraordinarily compelling reason for doing so"
April 2008] 1077
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(p. 180-81). In practice this means that the Supreme Court of Japan rarely
strikes down national legislation (p. 144).
Third, the individual right to expression is balanced with the commu-
nity's interests. In contrast to the unqualified language in the First
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, the Japanese Constitution expressly• 20 "
invites interest balancing, providing "a textual justification for weighing
the cost of an individual's or group's exercise of a particular right against
the relative cost of such exercise to the community as a whole" (p. 142).
Japan's approach is thus in stark contrast to that of the United States.
Japan's approach reflects a deferential, communitarian spirit that rejects a
Holmesian marketplace model and embraces a vision of free political dis-
cussion to promote democratic self-government. The consequence of this
approach is that far more speech goes unprotected, insofar as that speech
does not directly further the effort of self-governance (p. 161-62).
D. United Kingdom
The absence of meaningful judicial review is the most important hall-
mark that distinguishes human rights protections in the United Kingdom
from the United States. Because there is no written constitution, the doctrine
of parliamentary supremacy places the judiciary in the role of interpreting
parliamentary action, not overturning it. The Human Rights Act of 1998
does have a degree of judicial relief for free speech violations. But that
statutory guarantee limits judicial review to issuing a declaration of incom-
patibility, not invalidating parliamentary action: "The United Kingdom's
extraordinarily weak courts make consideration of human rights law at the
constitutional level significantly less important than in Canada, Germany,
Japan, and the United States" (p. 187).
In light of this structural difference, the free speech protections in the
United Kingdom are rarely countermajoritarian. Indeed, Krotoszynski ar-
gues that British free speech laws rely almost exclusively on cultural norms
to check abuse of the government's power to restrict or ban expression (p.
187). Notwithstanding the absence of a written constitutional guarantee,
however, British citizens enjoy strong free speech protections because of a
tradition of respect for free speech: "[T]he absence of a written free speech
guarantee need not be fatal to the recognition or vindication of free speech
claims against the government" (p. 213). By contrast, Krotoszynski suggests
that the U.S. Supreme Court occasionally abdicates its responsibilities to
uphold free speech, despite the written guarantee.
Almost in passing, Krotoszynski notes another major distinction be-
tween the United Kingdom and the United States: unlike the United States,
20. P. 41 ("Article 21 of the Japanese Constitution guarantees to all citizens '[flreedom of as-
sembly and association as well as speech, press, and all other forms of expression.' "); p. 142 ("Article
12 provides that '[tihe freedoms and rights guaranteed to the people by this Constitution shall be main-
tained by the constant endeavor of the people, who shall refrain from any abuse of these freedoms and
rights and shall always be responsible for utilizing them for the public welfare."').
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the United Kingdom has delegated to an international tribunal the authority
to determine the scope of free speech protections in that country. A claim
that a clear and unambiguous act of Parliament unlawfully abridges free
speech will have no claim of privilege in the British courts, but it may be
heard in the European Court of Human Rights ("ECHR") in Strasbourg for
alleged violations of the European Convention of Human Rights (pp. 192,
213). Thus in reality, the "constitutional" guarantees of free speech are in-
ternational treaty rights incorporated by parliamentary action through the
Human Rights Act. As a consequence, the United Kingdom's approach to
free speech will be shaped to a significant degree by the norms as set by the
ECHR.
III. THE CURSE OF DIMENSIONALITY
As is apparent from the above synopsis, Krotoszynski's book offers a
useful guide to the comparative experiences of five modem democracies. He
outlines the free speech guarantees of each country in light of five contex-
tual factors: text, structure, history, precedent, and national experience. 2'
After reading the book, it is quite apparent just how important each factor is
in understanding the free speech guarantees of each country.
The book also underscores the difficulties of a truly comprehensive free
speech analysis across different countries. In order to refute the claim that
the United States is an outlier, comparisons must be done across many dif-
ferent countries and factors, an undertaking that soon becomes unfeasible.
Anything less, however, is subject to selection bias and thus the erroneous
conclusion that certain nations fall into free speech clusters and others are
free speech outliers.
In Krotoszynski's book, the reference point for comparison is the United
States. In almost every instance, he compares the United States' approach
with that of either Canada, Germany, Japan, or the United Kingdom. Al-
though not explicitly analyzed in this fashion, in comparing the United
States to these four countries utilizing five contextual factors, Krotoszynski
in effect undertook twenty individual comparisons. His analysis is thus deep
but narrow.1
It is equally noteworthy that Krotoszynski did not broaden the analysis
by doing a country-by-country comparison of all five countries, which
would have required ten country comparisons instead of four." Had he un-dertaken that analysis using the five contextual factors, Krotoszynski would
21. Krotoszynski does not explicitly identify each of these as separate dimensions in his
comparison, but they are all present in his discussion of each country.
22. By "broad" or "narrow," I mean the number of countries subject to comparison. By
"deep" or "shallow," I mean the number of contextual factors used for comparison.
23. The ten comparisons would be (1) United States-Canada, (2) United States-Germany,
(3) United States-Japan, (4) United States-United Kingdom, (5) Canada-Germany, (6) Canada-
Japan, (7) Canada-United Kingdom, (8) Germany-Japan, (9) Germany-United Kingdom, and (10)
Japan-United Kingdom.
1079April 2008]
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have had to analyze fifty individual comparisons instead of twenty. Even
with only five countries subject to direct comparison, such analysis could
easily have become unwieldy.
Such broader and deeper comparisons are critical to address the com-
mon assertion that the United States is an international outlier.24 It may be
true that the United States is different from the other countries subject to
comparison; it may also be true that each country is different from the other.
Only constitutional comparisons that are done in high dimensional space"
can reveal whether or not there are free speech clusters and outliers or some
other relationship between the countries.
One also cannot resist asking why Krotoszynski only chose those five
modern democracies for comparison. Krotoszynski states that he limited his
comparisons to countries that observe the rule of law and possess serious
commitments to maintaining functional, participatory democracies. All five
countries, he states, seek to facilitate democratic deliberation as an essential
element of their polities and share similar political values and economic
circumstances (pp. 8-9). While that may be true, one suspects the increased
complexity of further comparisons of other peer countries also influenced
the specific number of countries Krotoszynski examined. A truly systematic
approach to free speech guarantees in modem democracies would engage in
direct country comparisons of many more countries. If one were to extend
the analysis to the thirty OECD countries--countries that have embraced
representative democracy and free market economies-it would offer a
much more detailed and comprehensive picture of free speech guarantees in
26
modern democracies. But the limits of such an approach are obvious. As-
suming the reference point would be the United States, a direct comparison
of the United States with twenty-nine other OECD countries using five con-
textual factors introduces 145 individual comparisons.
If one were to go further and undertake a truly comprehensive analysis
of all thirty OECD countries to each other, a country-by-country comparison
would require 435 direct country comparisons. 27 And if each country-by-
country comparison were done across the five contextual factors of text,
structure, history, precedent, and national experience, then this would intro-
24. Kenneth Anderson, Squaring the Circle? Reconciling Sovereignty and Global Govern-
ance Through Global Government Networks, 118 HARv. L. REv. 1255, 1288-89 (2005) (book
review); Slaughter, supra note 2, at 198.
25. That is, comparisons that analyze multiple countries using numerous speech variants
based on several contextual factors. See infra text accompanying notes 27-31.
26. This reference could easily be subject to criticism as unduly narrow. Rather than only
comparing thirty countries with one another, one could also include additional democracies, such as
countries under consideration for full OECD membership, including Brazil, Chile, China, Estonia,
India, Indonesia, Israel, Russia, Slovenia, and South Africa. Or one could focus on our common
heritage and compare the United States with over fifty countries that are part of the Commonwealth,
which more or less comprises the former British Empire.
27. The formula for this calculation is (n • (n - 1))/2, with n being the number of countries
subject to comparison. As applied to the OECD comparison, the formula would be (30 • 29)/2 = 435.
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duce 2175 comparisons.28 Such broad and deep comparisons generate results
that are exceedingly difficult to manage.
What I am suggesting is that comparative constitutional analysis suffers
• • 29
from the curse of dimensionality. A comparison of speech in two countries
(for example, the United States and Germany) using one contextual factor
(say, constitutional text) is easy. A comparison of five countries using five
contextual factors is complex. A comparison of thirty OECD countries using
those same five factors is exceedingly difficult.
All of the above assumes free speech comparisons at a substantively ho-
listic level of analysis. One could easily deepen the substantive component
of the analysis by dividing speech into variants-hate speech, defamation,
political speech, pornography, commercial speech-and then doing individ-
ual country comparisons of each speech variant. ° Adding five speech
variants to the OECD analysis above would require not 2175 comparisons
but 10,875.31
This curse of dimensionality raises serious questions about the feasibil-
ity of comparative constitutional analysis. A comparison of a few countries
is prone to error and selection bias. A comparison of numerous speech vari-
ants in many countries using multiple contextual factors offers a far-more-
accurate picture of free speech guarantees throughout the world. But as a
practical matter, utilizing a large-data-set, high-dimensional methodology is
unfeasible. Comparative constitutional analysis is cursed with the inability
to conceptually capture rich associations whose relationships are too com-
plex to be appreciated using traditional methods and simplistic comparisons.
As a result, scholars and judges typically opt for narrow and shallow
comparisons to overcome these conceptual difficulties. If they do a particu-
larly good job, their analyses might be broad and shallow--or narrow and
deep. But because of the curse of dimensionality, scholars-and especially
judges-almost never offer broad and deep comparisons. I do not question
Krotoszynski's serious and scholarly attempt at a narrow and deep compari-
son of free speech guarantees in five modem democracies. But in other
contexts, one cannot help but question the shallow and narrow comparisons
made by judges and scholars. For example, Justice Ginsburg's choice of
India for comparison of affirmative action; 31 Justice Breyer's choice ofJamaica and Zimbabwe, among others, for comparison of the "death row
28. 435 comparisons across five contextual factors introduces 2175 individual comparisons.
The equation is ((30 • 29)/2) . 5 = 2175.
29. 1 use the term loosely. This term was coined by Richard Bellman to refer to the mathe-
matical problem of exponential growth of volume as a function of dimensionality. RICHARD
BELLMAN, ADAPTIVE CONTROL PROCESSES 94(1961).
30. These variants could be subdivided further, such as dividing defamation into libel and
slander or dividing pornography into obscenity and indecency. And of course there are other vari-
ants, such as symbolic speech and speech that incites violence.
31. ((30 -29)/2) .5.5 = 10,875.
32. Ruth Bader Ginsburg & Deborah Jones Merritt, Affirmative Action: An International
Human Rights Dialogue, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 253, 273-77 (1999).
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phenomenon;"33 and Chief Justice Warren's choice of Ceylon and Scotland,
among others, for comparison of criminal procedures34 all seem suspect. So
does Chief Judge Kaye's choice of Ontario and Quebec for comparison of
New York's same-sex-marriage laws.35 The resulting dimensionality reduc-
tions appear to be random at best or driven by a desired outcome at worst.
When a jurist has nearly limitless foreign authority at her disposal, it is all
too tempting to canonize some of it as persuasive.
IV. THE CASE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL EXCEPTIONALISM
Accepting the limits of comparing the free speech experiences in just
five modern democracies, there are still extremely useful insights from
Krotoszynski's work. He recognizes the importance of pluralism in deter-
mining the content of free speech rights, and his analysis shows that each
country is exceptional in the free speech context. Given this pluralism, con-
stitutional exceptionalism-allowing each nation to decide how best to
balance competing rights in accordance with the local situation-is the only
way to give effect to countervailing rights that bear on free speech.
Speech law almost always reflects an accommodation of competing
rights. One can almost never say that a particular free speech accommoda-
tion is more rights enhancing than another: in reality, we are balancing
competing goods. The values of civility, privacy, human dignity, equality,
security, and liberty compete when one seeks to regulate speech, so ques-
tions of regulation of speech are not subject to obvious moral absolutes. One
cannot canvass the experiences of modem democracies and articulate a uni-
versal approach. There may be a universal consensus that speech should be
protected, but there is no universal agreement about the concrete application
of that guarantee. Krotoszynski's review of the United States, Canada,
Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom reveals vast differences of view-
point regarding the scope of the speech right, its theoretical basis, its priority
vis-A-vis other, competing rights, and the institution that best serves as its
guardian. Countries that value free speech share common questions, but they
do not share common answers.
So what is a comparativist to do? One response is to seek normative uni-
formity, thereby diminishing the need for broad and deep country
comparisons. That is often the agenda of international human rights activ-
ists. For example, a broad and deep comparison of the juvenile death penalty
would be of questionable utility because a multilateral treaty signed by over
33. Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 995-96 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
34. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 488-89 (1966).
35. Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1, 33-34 (N.Y. 2006) (Kaye, J., dissenting). For a
critique of Chief Judge Kaye's comparison, see Posting of Roger Alford to Opinio Juris,
http://www.opiniojuris.org/posts/I152302373.shtml (July 7, 2006 16:59).
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190 countries36 has led to uniformity on that human rights issue. Interna-
tional norm internalization has smoothed out most of the differences
between countries.
That approach represents the unusual circumstance in which almost all
countries have balanced competing interests and uniformly concluded that a
particular government practice must not be pursued. Far more common is
the situation-evident in the free speech context-in which one human right
is balanced against other competing goods on a country-by-country basis.
The precise balance achieved in each country will differ. And the dissonance
between countries need not be challenged in pursuit of uniformity. Indeed,
in those cases in which the differences reflect an appropriate balance of
competing goods, it should be celebrated. Constitutional exceptionalism
recognizes and celebrates each country's attempt to optimize its general
welfare by balancing competing goods in a manner consistent with its con-
stitutional text, structure, history, precedent, and national experience.
While Krotoszynski does not claim to be a constitutional exceptionalist,
he recognizes the importance of pluralism: indeed, that is perhaps the cen-
tral message of his book. He spends the final chapter addressing the
culturally contingent nature of human rights. He emphasizes that the free
speech approaches in each of the five countries reflect highly subjective
normative value judgments:
There is nothing intrinsically good or bad about [such subjective, norma-
tive value judgments], but such a state of affairs effectively belies any
claim to some Platonic idea or Natural Law definition of free speech that
judges, regardless of cultural influences, will reflexively identify and intui-
tively apply to reach largely identical results in cases presenting more-or-
less similar facts. (p. 215)
Rather than accepting the common criticism of American exceptionalism in
the free speech context,37 Krotoszynski is suggesting something quite differ-
ent. He is positing, after a close examination of the free speech experiences
of five modern democracies, that each country is exceptional:
Disagreement seems to arise not so much about the values that free speech
advances, but, rather, over the relative importance of these values when
measured against other competing social goals and objectives. Thus, the
particular implementation of shared concerns about the value of free
speech does not allow for predictable results across legal cultures ....
(p. 218)
36. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 37, adopted Nov. 20, 1989,
1577 U.N.T.S. 44.
37. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Exceptional First Amendment, in AMERICAN EXCEP-
TIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTs 29, 30 (Michael Ignatieff ed., 2005) [hereinafter Schauer,
Exceptional First Amendment] ("[T]he American First Amendment... remains a recalcitrant outlier
to a growing international understanding of what the freedom of expression entails."); Frederick
Schauer, Do Cases Make Bad Law?, 73 U. CHI. L. REv. 883, 902 (2006) (noting that the free-speech
libel law adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court has not been adopted by any country in the past forty
years).
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The conclusion that each country is exceptional is correct but controver-
sial. Many claim instead that all human rights norms are, or should be,
universal. But such claims focus on norm abstractions rather than norm ap-
plication. The mere recognition of a universal norm does not resolve
concrete questions about its observance, including the scope or definition of
the right, the priority to be given to a particular right over other human
rights, and the circumstances in which abridgement of that right is appropri-
ate for the general welfare.
To illustrate, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights makes broad
claims about the obligation of "every individual and every organ of society"
to "promote respect for these rights and freedoms" and "secure their univer-
sal and effective recognition and observance. '38 But there is an inherent
tension at play in balancing the norms set forth in the Universal Declaration.
For example, Article 19 guarantees everyone "the right to freedom of opin-
ion and expression."'' Article 12 safeguards everyone against "attacks upon
his honour and reputation."' Article 7 guarantees "equal protection against
any discrimination ... and against any incitement to such discrimination.'
Article 18 guarantees everyone the right to "freedom of thought, conscience
and religion," including the right "to manifest his religion or belief in teach-
,,42ing. Article 29 provides "everyone shall be subject only to such
limitations as are determined by law solely for the purpose of securing...
respect for the rights and freedoms of others and of meeting the just re-
quirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic
society.
' 43
While these are all universal norms, it is uncertain how each country
should balance these potentially competing interests. There is normative
indeterminacy about how any particular country should balance the right to
free speech (however hateful or dangerous) and the right to teach one's re-
ligion (however inflammatory or discriminatory) against the right to be free
from discrimination or incitement thereof, the right to be free from attack
against one's honor and reputation, and the restrictions on rights for the sake
of morality, public order and the general welfare. Constitutional exception-
alism accepts that different countries will reach different conclusions about
how to balance these universal norms.
The point of constitutional exceptionalism is not to deny the existence or
importance of any particular right; rather it is to accept the legitimacy of
each country's attempt in its constitutional order to balance competing rights
and interests as an expression of its cultural and national identity. Context
38. G.A. Res. 217A (HI), supra note 1, pmnbl.
39. Id. art. 19.
40. Id. art. 12.
41. Id. art. 7.
42. Id. art. 18.
43. Id. art. 29(2).
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matters far more than constitutional comparativists are often willing to
admit. To give a concrete example, perhaps there really is something differ-
ent about countries with nonparliamentary, nonproportional representation
systems that provides the stability to buffer against antidemocratic forces,
thus explaining why such countries will tolerate far more politically dan-
gerous speech than other democracies." How should a comparativist factor
that structural component into an analysis of the regulation of political
speech?
The common refrain of constitutional comparativists is that foreign
experiences offer persuasive authority that may serve as a useful guide to
judges in their constitutional decision making. Since all modem democra-
cies are facing the same basic problems and are searching for the same
basic answers, why not examine how other constitutional courts have ad-
dressed the problem? 5 Jeremy Waldron analogizes citation to foreign
authority to scientific investigation: "[T]he law of nations is available to
lawmakers and judges as an established body of legal insight, reminding
them that their particular problem has been confronted before and that
they, like scientists, should try to think it through in the company of those
who have already dealt with it."'46 Scientific findings represent a repository
of enormous value: it would be unthinkable for any scientific researcher to
ignore them.47 Waldron argues that "legal science" relies "on the idea that
solutions to certain kinds of problems in the law might get established in
the way that scientific theories are established. 48
But the scientific method is a poor analogy for the project of global con-
stitutionalism. Such an analogy rests on false assumptions about constitutional
decision making. It assumes that one can engage in shallow comparisons
without contextualizing in light of a country's text, structure, history, prece-
dent, and national experience. A scientific researcher offers a theoretical
hypothesis, tests that hypothesis in the laboratory through experimental study,
controls all variables that might alter the results, and reaches a scientific con-
clusion based on falsifiable tests in a controlled environment.
The constitutional jurist does nothing of the kind in interpreting consti-
tutional norms. The proper analogy is not the sterile laboratory of the
scientist but rather the earthy vineyard of the oenologist. Every winemaker
starts with the same basic ingredients, utilizes the same basic techniques,
and enlists the same chemical reactions of fermentation-all in pursuit of
44. Samuel Issacharoff, Fragile Democracies, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1405, 1419 (2007).
45. Stephen Breyer, R~flexions Relatives au Principe de Fraternit: Allocution prononcde au
Troisi~me congr~s de lAssociation des cours constitutionnelles ayant en partage lusage du franqais
(June 20, 2003), http://www.supremecourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp-06-20-03.html (last visited
Feb. 10, 2008) (noting that judges everywhere face the same problems and have the same types of
legal instruments to fix them and that differences in language and culture should not matter).
46. Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modem lus Gentium, 119 HARv. L. REV. 129, 133
(2005).
47. Id. at 132-33.
48. Id. at 144.
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the perfect wine for that environment. But the winemaker knows all too
well that local conditions such as geology, climate, and culture-what the
French call terroir-dramatically shape the expression and personality of
the wine. 49 The winemaker cannot control for these local variables any
more than the jurist can control for the country's text, structure, history,
precedent, and national experience.
There is no question that free speech is a universal value that requires
and deserves recognition. And perhaps the universality of this norm is part
of a country's "macroclimate" that marginally influences the cultivation of
the norm.50 But even so, the free speech norm is given its distinctive per-
sonality in different cultures based on the local conditions of that country.
The results are greatly influenced, if you will, by a country's constitutional
terroir.
If one examines the American, Canadian, German, Japanese, and British
approaches to freedom of expression, one cannot help but appreciate the
impact that local conditions have had on the end product. Legal profes-
sionals have spent vast amounts of time and energy cultivating this
norm-country by country, region by region. In each region, this norm is
expressed in a manner that reflects the distinctive characteristics of the
land. While different from one region to another, each approach is none-
theless pleasing in its distinctive way."
CONCLUSION
Constitutional comparativists frequently lament American exceptional-
ism.52 We are warned that American exceptionalism is a "Jekyll-and-Hyde"
49. Terroir has been defined as "the total impact of any given site-soil, slope, orientation to
the sun, and elevation, plus every nuance of climate .... Generally viticulturists believe that soil
indirectly bestows flavor (and relative quality) only insofar as it is one of the voices in the chorus of
terroir." KAREN MACNEIL, THE WINE BIBLE 21 (2001).
50. In winemaking, the macroclimate refers to the climate of an entire geographic region.
While the macroclimate will influence the wine, it is the mesoclimate (the climate of a specific
vineyard site) and the microclimate (the climate of the grape cluster) that give wine its distinctive
personality. JONATHAN SWlNCHATT & DAVID G. HOWELL, THE WINEMAKER's DANCE: EXPLORING
TERROIR IN THE NAPA VALLEY 112 (2004).
51. It is worth noting, of course, that "Great Wines Don't Come from Just Anywhere."
MACNEIL, supra note 49, at 12. The same is true of free speech. Countries struggling to attain the
status of modem democracies contribute their own distinctive characteristics in the cultivation of the
free speech norm. The quality of the norm in that region suffers as a result of that country's poor
constitutional terroir. For this reason, my discussion of constitutional exceptionalism is limited to
modern democracies.
52. For background on American exceptionalism, see, for example, SEYMOUR MARTIN
LIPSET, AMERICAN EXCEPTIONALISM: A DOUBLE-EDGED SWORD (1996); AMERICAN EXCEPTIONAL-
ISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 37; Philip Bobbitt, American Exceptionalism: The Exception
Proves the Rule, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 328 (2005); Steven G. Calabresi, "A Shining City On a
Hill": American Exceptionalism and the Supreme Court's Practice of Relying on Foreign Law, 86
B.U. L. REV. 1335 (2006); Harold Hongju Koh, Foreword: On American Exceptionalism, 55 STAN.
L. REV. 1479 (2003); Judith Resnik, Law's Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues,
and Federalism's Multiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564 (2006).
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specter that threatens our global village.53 We are advised that American
exceptionalism raises fundamental questions about "the very place of the
world's most powerful nation inside the network of international laws ...
that regulate a globalizing world. 54
But if American exceptionalism is seen within the larger environment of
constitutional exceptionalism, then the focus shifts. The question is no
longer what makes America different but rather what degree of respect we
should accord to each country's distinct and varied articulations of human
rights norms. The focus is no longer about national sovereignty but rather
norm indeterminacy.
At least in the United States, the most salient experience with constitu-
tional comparativism has been with respect to the Eighth Amendment
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, particularly as applied to the
death penalty. Proponents of comparative law have a strong moral claim that
little leeway should be given to modem democracies on capital punishment.
Death penalty abolitionists attempt to "shame the United States by the dual
strategy of highlighting the unsavory character of the rest of the 'death pen-
alty club' while at the same time noting that Europe (and Canada, Australia,
New Zealand, Mexico, and many other countries) seem to manage well
enough without resorting to executions."" Not surprisingly, arguments for
constitutional exceptionalism that begin and end with capital punishment
find few adherents. Norm determinacy diminishes arguments for constitu-
tional exceptionalism.
The great gift of Krotoszynski's book is to turn our attention to a knot-
tier subject on which there is far less consensus. If modern democracies
disagree about the essentials of free speech theory and practice, there is little
basis for shaming a constitutional outlier. Of course, one can try to play that
game by analyzing a particular free speech variant-say, defamation or hate
speech-comparing the United States' practice to a few select countries
based on one or two contextual factors, and simplistically declaring the
United States a "freedom of expression outlier.'5 6 But such dimensionality
reductions ignore the reality that a careful examination of multiple free
speech variants in multiple countries using multiple contextual factors sug-
gests something quite different. Each country is different from the United
States, but each country is also different from one another.
For comparativists in search of common constitutional norms, the best
maxim may be that the "exceptions prove the rule." That seems apropos for
53. Harold Hongju Koh, America's Jekyll-and-Hyde Exceptionalism, in AMERICAN EXCEP-
TIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 37, at 111, 111.
54. Michael Ignatieff, Introduction: American Exceptionalism and Human Rights, in AMERI-
CAN EXCEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 37, at 1, 2.
55. Carol S. Steiker, Capital Punishment and American Exceptionalism, in AMERICAN Ex-
CEPTIONALISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 37, at 57, 59-60.
56. Schauer, Exceptional First Amendment, supra note 37, at 42; Frederick Schauer, The
Wily Agitator and the American Free Speech Tradition, 57 STAN. L. REV. 2157, 2160 n.9 (2005)
(book review); see also ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 182, 243 (2004).
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a comparative analysis regarding something like the juvenile death penalty.
But in other instances, such as freedom of expression, the better maxim may
be that "[a] rule is not proved by exceptions unless the exceptions them-
selves lead one to infer a rule. 57 Constitutional exceptionalism posits that
where the exceptions refute the existence of a common constitutional rule,
different answers to common questions are to be celebrated.
57. The maxim is attributed to Lord Atkin. Fender v. St. John-Mildmay, [1938] A.C. 1, 14
(H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.).
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